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Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google once said: ‘If you have something you don’t want 
anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place’.1 Luckily law does not 
think this way when it comes to privacy. Privacy became a hot topic in modern days’ 
personality protection law. Personality rights are getting more and more precious in 
modern civil societies, extending the original concept of freedom for a person as it started 
in the 18th century during the French revolution. The definition of ‘persona’ is not a creature 
of modern days. In the 2nd century AD, the Institutions of Gauis and its successor, the 
commonly cited Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian, the Roman Emperor delivered a formal 
understanding of natural person as a subject of civil law. Natural persons were present in 
two dimensions of law: in connection with legal capacity and the capacity to act, secondly 
as an actor of social inter-personal relationships, like marriage, guardianship or adoption. 
Later, when the classic civil codes gained codified form in the 19th century, they all – most 
notably the French Code Civil and the German Bürgeliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) – continued this 
perspective as a Roman law heritage. Status of a person, however, went further and 
supplemented classic capacity provisions with freedoms of a natural person against not 
only the state and the sovereign power but other natural persons and legal entities. 
Personality rights were constitutional freedoms, privileges originally. These freedoms 
erected boundaries for the almost unlimited power of the sovereign or tyranny. When 
urbanization became more intense, the society communicated its general needs to a more 
protective and more general personality rights concept. Sanctuary of private property was 
a generally accepted need of people in the Middle Ages, while trespass to person was rare 
back in the rural style of living. Natural law and the theories of Enlightenment 
philosophers (Thomasius, Grotius, Pufendorf, etc.) placed the question of personal 
freedom and personality rights on the pedestal and claimed a more general understanding 
on these rights and privileges.2 Individual determination was a core element of this concept 
and it required an individual approach onpersonal freedom that protected natural persons 
against both the state and other individuals. We would say that tort law – as it is called in 
common law countries – gained its origin from this change of paradigm. A person who 
chose poorly under the given circumstances causing damage or harm to another person 
shall be liable for his or her act and shall bear the consequences. Tort law got separated 
from criminal law, getting a more private perspective that focused mainly on 
reparation/compensation rather than punishment. Constitutional freedoms got a new 
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wing in the form of innate human rights belonging to all individuals guaranteeing them 
absolute immunity against another natural person’s tortious acts.3  
Privacy law is hard to define, as there is no general legal definition of what rights constitute 
personality. Most modern civil codes do not provide an exhaustive list on such rights. 
However, we would say that privacy rights have a firm connection with human dignity. 
Human dignity is the flagship of personality rights and provides for the core of personality 
protection. All personality rights are denominations of human dignity and shall be 
interpreted in an absolute way. The right to privacy is the most important right to a natural 
person to choose which information becomes public and who can interfere in his or her 
personal life. Privacy law, in a negative concept, may be summarized and defined as a right 
to be left alone. Seclusion, secrecy are essential elements of privacy law.4 Only public 
matters should be public and private life must be respected. In modern days we are 
struggling more with privacy law. Under the rapid evolution of technology and the easy 
and frequent connection between people, it is very hard to categorize which information 
belongs to public matters and which to private ones. The once absolute theory of 
personality protection and personality rights are stuck in between two very different 
purposes. In one hand, the general need to fully respect privacy and strengthen its 
protection against unwanted interference pushes privacy law to a strictly protective and 
almost absolute understanding on privacy rights. On the other hand, the common interest 
in guaranteeing technology a more rapid development and making life more modern and 
easier requires the existence of the introduction of certain limits in the protection of 
privacy, making certain aspects of privacy a collateral damage or sacrifice in the altar of 
social development.5 Biotechnology, online profiling, RFID technology, social networks, 
global navigation systems are all keys to the future, however most of them brings privacy 
questions in the forefront. Is it possible to find that narrow but safe dividing line between 
the two interests? Is it a reality to create a somewhat international approach to the laws of 
privacy? We would not say yes or no to either one of these questions. The purpose of this 
essay is to demonstrate national models and their differences or even similarities in the 
protection of privacy rights. We understand the impossibility to use general definitions or 
terminology to similar legal institutions in various countries. However, we firmly believe 
that common law and civil law legal systems are getting closer and closer to each other 
regarding the final answer to the same problem or question. We are not talking about 
doctrinal approximation but the harmonization of solutions. It would be foolish to deny 
the importance of constitutional law and the general understanding on legal policies and 
legislative interests in a particular state when it comes to privacy matters. We still think 
there is a global need to respect privacy rights and to provide for a safe and easy way of 
technical and social growth and development. This hypothesis is our starting point and 
this is why this essay intends to analyze some so-called ‘hot topics’ in modern days’ privacy 
law. Deliberately, we did not pick those brand new questions like biotechnology or RFID 
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technology but some long existing and well-known privacy issues in connection with right 
to image.  
 
II. Tort law, the law of delicts and privacy law 
 
Privacy law has a firm connection to the law of torts in common law legal systems and the 
civil law of delicts. While in civil law legal systems there are no such things as torts, 
common law strongly emphasizes those unlawful acts or omissions that lead to causing 
harm or damage to another person.6 The common law approach is closer to the concept 
of penal law that provides a list of unlawful behaviors rather than focusing on the end 
result of an act or omission. In fact, the original English tort theory is much closer to the 
ancient system of Roman law than the continental ones. Specific actions and torts were 
characteristic features of the ancient Roman law, mixing certain punitive elements in the 
idea of reparation. In civil law systems, delicts are private wrongs disregarding their form. 
All major civil codes in Europe put a significant emphasis on the actual outcome of a 
wrongful act. In most European civil law countries tort law is more like a law of 
compensation with the sole purpose to provide compensation to the aggrieved party, the 
injured person. In theory this reparative perspective seems to be bullet proof even in the 
complicated, technology driven era of the 21st century. However, we must note that there 
is an important dividing line between infringement against a person or his personality rights 
and the trespass to property. In the latter case monetary damages presume full 
compensation. Since these types of damages are calculable and measurable, it is relatively 
easy to exclude any punitive character from the procedure and to solely focus on making 
the plaintiff whole again. While in case of infringements against a person and it personality 
rights, this airtight theory of full compensation poorly fails. Personality rights are the most 
precious rights of a natural person. This is why personality rights do not have a commercial 
value. They are not transferrable. In fact, they are so precious that they are invaluable. 
Hurting any of these rights brings multiple problems to the surface. First, the existence of 
any harm is highly questionable. In contrary to monetary damage, immaterial harms are 
hard if not impossible to prove in most cases. Beyond the bodily harms, inner harms and 
psychological harms are not obvious to anyone other than the injured party himself. The 
civil law concept of compensation fails when a particular harm of damage is not proven in 
a lawsuit. Compensation as a core element in the law of delicts does not exist without some 
loss/harm that requires for compensation. Combine this impossible theory with the judge-
centered character of most civil law litigation processes and you may get to the wrong 
conclusion that such damages are not granted in European civil law legal systems. Luckily 
it is not the case. Although civil law legal systems owe to deliver a firm theoretical 
background to this problem, in every system, immaterial harms are compensable 
throughout Europe and most certainly in the member states of the European Union.7 This 
is only possible if either the legislator or the courts – or in some cases both – abandon the 
law of delicts from this heavily harm-driven nature in cases of restitution for damages for 
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non-pecuniary loss. Despite of the diverse explanations on how this is possible, the 
outcome is very similar to the common law concept of torts. Doctrinal differences may 
serve as enormous obstacles in some cases, while in general, the right to privacy is granted 
to natural persons both in common law and civil law jurisdictions.  
 
III. Right to image vs. publicity  
 
Right to image is a popular element of privacy. Not only your inner secrets, feelings and 
opinions should remain hidden from curious looks but the most evident form of yourself: 
your image. Taking a picture, a snapshot of a person may be illegal on these grounds. The 
protection of privacy can, in principle, be realized through the right of image. In Austria, 
the Urheberechtsgesetz, (Copyright Act) (UrhG) in its § 78 grants this right to individuals. 
However, this provision only awards a claim if the snapshot is published. The mere taking 
of a photo is not enough to merit a claim. Publicity remains a core issue in privacy law 
anyway. This is one dividing line in legislation whether any infringement of privacy requires 
certain publicity, publicity other than the tortfeasor, the violator. In Austria, § 1328a and § 
16 of ABGB (the Austrian Civil Code) aim to prevent violation of privacy. According to 
these provisions, not only the publication or dissemination of private information results 
in sanctions but even the mere intrusion into privacy. It seems to be a general problem on 
how to interpret a general clause of privacy together with a specific provision related to a 
particular element of privacy rights. Normally the old principle of lex specialis derogate lex 
generalies should be applied and go for the denial of compensation if taking a picture lacks 
publicity. However, this is not the case, or at least, it is not that simple. Even the mere 
publishing of an unwanted photo would not result in awarding damages to the subject. 
Infringement of privacy does not necessary mean that the mere fact of unwanted 
publication happens. If the subject was not in a humiliating situation in the picture or the 
photo does not describe him in an intimate position or life setting, damages for non-
pecuniary loss is not granted in Austria. However, we may find other countries in Europe 
that treats right to image as a truly absolute right of a person. In Hungary, for example, the 
simple unwanted taking of a picture entitles the subject to claim pain award, a recently 
established legal institution in Hungarian civil law (introduced by the 2013 Hungarian Civil 
Code, Ptk)8. We may also see that some personality interests are of economic value to the 
media. This is why unjust enrichment may take into consideration in unlawful infringement 
of right to image, even if damages for non-pecuniary losses are not granted in a particular 
case. We must note, however, that proving the increase in profit for the media may be 
troublesome. A classic civil law compensation case requires four preconditions before 
awarding any damages. The existence and amount of the damage, the unlawful act (or 
omission), causal link that all damage you suffered is a result of this unlawful act and finally 
fault on the side of the tortfeasor. Both the amount of damage and the causal link would 
be a problem in a right to image case. Assume the subject of the unwanted picture is a 
public figure. Unless that specific issue of the newspaper was sold to a bigger audience of 
readers than normally, evidence is easy. If no increase in selling numbers is evident, we do 
not see how the plaintiff may claim an award on the grounds of unjust enrichment. 
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According to § 87, subs 2 UrhG in Austria and § 2:52 Ptk. in Hungary, the seriousness of 
the infringement is not a precondition of awarding compensation for non-economic loss. 
In case of a small infringement that is theoretically an infringement against personality 
rights, the compensation awarded may be simply nominal in value. This perspective brings 
us back to the original hypothesis: civil law and common law legal systems are getting 
closer in the area of privacy infringements. Compensation idea is completely missing in 
case of nominal damages. Still classic civil law countries like Austria ad Hungary may award 
it anyway, just to express disapproval of the unlawful act.  
Another interesting angle in this case is whether the actual situation in which the unwanted 
photo was taken matters or not. Professional or business affairs are not covered by the 
provisions on protection of privacy in Austria.9 If the photograph has no specific intimate 
or defamatory content, the subject does not even have a claim if he is attending to his 
private affairs. It is even more so the case if the subject was at work. The place where the 
photo was taken really counts. In a public place (in the street, the market, in a concert or 
any other public event) a person is entitled to less privacy than in his own home. The idea 
is that in public places and events a person may expect such infringements as he is more 
exposed to publicity than in a private place. The public place defense is not an absolute 
defense. A snapshot taken in a public place may not focus on a particular person without 
his consent in some jurisdictions. In Hungary if the person is the main character in the 
photo taken in a public place and the snapshot describes him in an unfavorable and 
unwanted defamatory position, this may be an infringement against privacy and may entitle 
the subject to claim pain award.10 It would also grant the subject damages, if he was 
exposed on the picture being the main character and star of the photo. In England the 
mere taking of a photograph in a public place does not constitute a claim. The subject may 
claim in breach of confidence if the photo is published in a newspaper. Although this 
would highly depend on whether there would have been a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in respect of the photo. In England we find no law against the taking of a 
photograph and the reproduction of it unless one owns a copyright to it. Even the fact 
that the subject is a public figure does not count in England. According to Lloyd J ‘merely 
because a well-known person tries to stop people taking photographs of him or her it does 
not follow that any picture taken in evasion or defiance of those attempts is in breach of 
confidentiality'.11 The Human Rights Act 1998 in England supplemented this concept with 
another aspect. Infringement would be noted if a person actually tries to stop someone 
else from taking photographs of him. In this case the resist shall prevent the taking of the 
picture. If the photographer proceeds anyway, infringement against right to privacy would 
happen. Finnish law is very resistant to grant protection to people in the form of right to 
image. There is no specific provision exists to allow a person the right to prohibit 
snapshots being taken of him if the picture is taken in a public place. No permission is 
required from the subject if the photo is taken in the street or in any other private places. 
Only defamation may lead to a successful claim. If the person is shown in a position or 
life situation that is humiliating or grotesque, the subject has a claim. Finnish law even 
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allows the publication of any unwanted photos unless they constitute a defamatory act. If 
the picture is used for a commercial purpose, the consent of the subject is essential 
prerequisite. This doctrine has no legislative background. The rule was created by judicial 
practice.12  
In France it counts whether the subject on a photo taken in a public place is a famous 
public figure or not. A public figure cannot enjoin the taking and publishing of the photo. 
If the subject is not famous, he can enjoin the publication of the photograph. However, a 
complex defense would exist. The photo should be taken in a public place, there must be 
an incidental position of he subject in the photo, or the fact that the subject had been 
photographed while exercising his profession. None of the defenses will suffice to justify 
the subjects lack of consent. It is a general doctrine that ‘the fact that a person (even of 
topical interest or known by the public) is located in a public place does not mean that the 
person renounced his/her rights to image and privacy’.13 The German approach is very 
similar to this but with a new dimension. If the subject knows the photographer, his 
implicit consent to take the photo may be presumed. This presumed consent must not be 
extended to publishing the photo. It seems to be a general standard in privacy cases that 
any consent given to a specific intrusion shall not be interpreted extensively. There is also 
a general prohibition in Germany to prevent the unwanted publication of humiliating 
photos. Photographs depicting situations that put a person into a false light or embarrass 
or humiliate him (like intimate situations or naked poses) are barred from publication.14 
There was one specific case when in Germany the distribution of a copy of one of the 
photographs of Katharina Witt – taken from Playboy’s website – in a newspaper was 
allowed for its informative value because the paper distributed the copy in connection with 
a short satirical article about the fact that Witt had exposed herself in Playboy.15 This case 
shows again how different the right to privacy and most notably the right to image in case 
of public figures.  
 
IV. Comparative remarks 
 
Right to image is protected in countries examined above in general. The most notable 
differences in the level of protection can be identified in case of publication of a photo 
taken from a person. While Austria, Hungary, England, France and German all prescribe 
some consent prerequisite to publication Finnish law is more liberal to the press in this 
regard. Only publication for commercial use constitutes a case in Finland. The other 
notable difference is the situation when public figures come into the picture. In this essay 
we do not analyze what significances create a public figure in law, however this 
classification is very subjective in judicial practice. First, territorial approach is important 
in regard to what extent the infringement got publicity. Even the subject well known in a 
small town may be a public figure if the infringement got publicity in that particular town. 
Secondly, situation also counts. The purpose of publishing a picture taken from a public 
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figure should serve objective and true providing of information to members of the public 
rather than humiliating the personality of the given famous person (see German law). In 
general, public figures shall bear more intrusion in privacy than the not so famous ones. 
The most notable difference in protection can be seen in defamation and libel cases. The 
European approach of libel and slander is more restrictive than the U.S. theory. You may 
criticize a politician and his views involving some of his personal issues and characteristic 
features in the opinion until it is not overly humiliating and totally independent from the 
debate. Once the speech is purely about to destroy and attack the human character and 
human dignity of the politician and not his views, award may be granted to him. This is 
somewhat the case with public figures’ right to image as well. Pictures taken in public 
places of public figures are not infringements in most countries even if the subject is 
captured in a humiliating defamatory position. Being a public figure always requires you to 
pay attention what you are doing if in a public place. 
Consent is crucial for taking a picture of another person. There is a trend in European 
countries that tacit consent is also sufficient. The simple knowledge that someone is taking 
a picture of you is enough for the photographer to rely on your consent. Protest is an 
option if you know about this action, so tacitly allowing the photographer to take the 
picture is a good enough defense on his side. Publication, however, is a more serious 
problem in most countries, so tacit consent is not acceptable, except in Finland.16 The 
purpose of publication is very important in determining whether there is a right to get 
damages or not. Unjust enrichment may also serve as a last relief if damages for non-
pecuniary loss would not be an option. The latter one, however, requires some painful 
evidence process if the purpose of using the picture is not evidentially and clearly 
commercial. 
Right to image not only remained an important element of one’s privacy but got more 
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